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EXTORTION MAY NO LONGER MEAN EXTORTION AFTER
SCHEIDLER V. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC.
MATIrHEW T. GRADY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ms. A, who was in the third trimester of her pregnancy, learned that her
baby would not have a functioning heart, and thus, would live a short life
marked by constant pain and suffering.' After discussing the matter with
her husband and their religious and medical advisors, Ms. A painfully
decided that an abortion was the best option.2 When Ms. A went to an
abortion clinic, a protest "blockade" by Operation Rescue was in full force. 3
Consequently, Ms. A and two other young rape victims (including a four-
teen year old), who were separately seeking the clinic's services, were
trapped inside the same car in stifling, 110-degree heat.4 Meanwhile, anti-
abortion protest groups continually spat at the women, shook their vehicle,
screamed vulgar names at the women, and physically prevented the women
from entering the clinic. 5 Ms. A and the two young girls had to wait inside
the hot car for two days until federal marshals could clear a path to the
clinic. 6
Unfortunately, the experiences of Ms. A and the young rape victims are
not uncommon, as shown by the similar experience of Ms. B.7 Ms. B
attempted to enter an abortion clinic to receive services wholly unrelated to
abortion.8 Ms. B had undergone cancer surgery in an effort to preserve her
reproductive organs, and she went to a clinic to obtain a post-operative
check-up. 9 Since Ms. B was still too weak to drive herself to the
*J.D., cum laude, 2004, University of Illinois College of Law; B.S., with honors, 2001,
University of Illinois. Matthew T. Grady is presently serving as a Judge Advocate in the United
States Army. The author would like to sincerely thank all those who contributed to the success of
this article.
1. Fay Clayton & Sara N. Love, NOW v. Scheidler: Protecting Women's Access to
Reproductive Health Services, 62 ALB. L. REV. 967, 982 (1999). The patient's actual name has
been withheld to preserve anonymity.
2. Id.
3. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 65-69 (detailing the protest tactic of "blockades"
used by anti-abortion groups).
4. Id. at 982-83.
5. Id. at 983.
6. Id. at 982-83.
7. See id. at 987 (withholding the patient's actual name to preserve anonymity).
8. Clayton, supra note 1, at 988.
9. Id.
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appointment, her minister provided a ride to the clinic for her.a0 When the
two reached the clinic, they found that another Operation Rescue "block-
ade" was underway. 1' When the members of Operation Rescue observed
Ms. B attempting to reach the clinic entrance, they attacked her.12 The
protestors scratched, clawed, and clubbed Ms. B with an anti-abortion sign
until she became unconscious.1 3 The attack caused the sutures from Ms.
B's surgery to rupture,14 and as a result of this attack, Ms. B had to be
immediately rushed to the emergency room at a nearby hospital.15
Regrettably, the violent tactics used by anti-abortion protestors have
only increased over time, despite Congressional enactment of the Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE") in 1994.16 While these
protests, "blockades," and "rescues" have a dramatic effect on many people
and clinics,17 the possible criminal punishments faced by the perpetrators
under state law are remarkably slight. For instance, in United States v.
Arena,18 the defendants poured butyric acid on various Planned Parenthood
Centers, which forced the facilities to close for several days.19 Numerous
patients and employees suffered various physical illnesses after inhaling the
toxic fumes. 20 Moreover, the attacks frightened those affected, as many
patients stopped receiving services and many staff members quit.21 In the
meantime, the anti-abortion protestors did not hide their agenda in any
fashion, as they sought "to prevent abortions from taking place."22 Despite
the severity of their criminal actions and the seriousness of the
10. Id.
11. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 65-69 (detailing the protest tactic of "blockades"
used by anti-abortion groups).
12. Id. at 988-89.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2001).
16. See, e.g., Ex-Gi Held In Abortion Clinic Bomb Conspiracy, Ctfl TRIB., Nov. 13, 2003, at
20 (describing how Stephen John Jordi came very close to carrying out his plans to bomb various
abortion clinics throughout Florida and Georgia). See also 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994) (setting forth
the FACE Act's prohibited practices, penalties, and remedies).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 387-88 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing how
defendants only received five years probation for their acid attack on a clinic). After anti-abortion
protesters poured butyric acid into a Planned Parenthood facility, it ceased operations for ten days
and incurred substantial environmental cleanup costs and increased security costs. Id.
Additionally, the court observed the devastating physical and psychological effects inflicted on
patients and staff members alike subsequent to the attacks, ranging from headaches and nausea to
elevated feelings of anger, fear, and dread. Id.
18. 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999).
19. Arena, 180 F.3d at 385-87.
20. Id. at 388.
21. id.
22. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2001).
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consequences that ensued, the defendants in Arena were only charged with
criminal mischief and endangering public safety under New York law.2 3
Subsequently, they either pled guilty or were convicted, and were merely
sentenced to five years of probation.24
Against this backdrop, the United States Supreme Court was recently
presented with Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.,25 where
anti-abortion protest groups, such as those involved in the beginning
examples, 26 were charged with extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act.27
The Court faced the issue of whether intangible rights, such as the right of a
business to exercise exclusive control over its assets, could be "obtained"
for purposes of the Hobbs Act.2 8 Stated differently, the Court was asked to
decide whether the Hobbs Act requires an extortionist to physically
"obtain" or receive the property that he or she was forcing another to part
with by fear.29
This article argues that Scheidler has substantially altered the
traditional, common-law understanding of the meaning of extortion which
evolved under the Hobbs Act. Unfortunately, this distortion will have a
profoundly negative effect on future prosecutions of extortion under the
Hobbs Act. Part II of this article discusses the text of the Hobbs Act and
the relevant legislative history surrounding its enactment in 1948. Part II
also details the facts and procedural posture of Scheidler. Part III argues
that the Hobbs Act was indeed violated under the facts presented in
Scheidler. Part III also reveals that the Court's resolution in Scheidler was
fundamentally flawed, both as a matter of statutory interpretation and
policy. Moreover, Part III demonstrates that Scheidler will only undermine
the effectiveness of the Hobbs Act as a tool for effective law enforcement
and prosecution of organized crime. Such a result is directly contrary to the
will of Congress, as reflected in the legislative history surrounding the
passage of the Hobbs Act. Finally, Part IV advocates that future courts
construe Scheidler very narrowly, patterned after the narrow interpretation
given in Dooley v. Crab Boat Owners Association.30 Alternatively, Part IV
23. Arena, 180 F.3d at 388.
24. Id.
25. 537 U.S. 393 (2003).
26. See supra text accompanying notes 1-16 (discussing activities and protest techniques of
some anti-abortion groups).
27. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 398.
28. Id. at 400-01.
29. Id. at 401.
30. 271 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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encourages Congress to overturn Scheidler via an amendment to the Hobbs
Act.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND THE ELEMENTS OF
A HOBBS ACT VIOLATION PREMISED ON EXTORTION
The Hobbs Act prohibits "[i]nterference with commerce by threats or
violence" as follows:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in com-
merce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or
commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property
in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, or both.31
The Hobbs Act then defines "extortion" as "the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 32 Consequently,
the primary elements of an extortion violation under the Hobbs Act are:
"(1) that the defendants induce their victims to part with property; (2) that
the defendants do so through the use of fear; and (3) that, in so doing, the
defendants adversely affect interstate commerce." 33 As a simple example,
extortion occurs if one threatens to take another's good name or business
reputation unless the latter pays the former one thousand dollars. 34 In such
an instance, the extortionist has physically "obtained" the victim's one
thousand dollars, which the victim paid out of fear to keep his or her
favorable business reputation.35 Of course, this example assumes that the
adverse effect on interstate commerce requirement has been met, which is
not difficult to do.36
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000).
32. Id. § 1951(b)(2).
33. United States v. Local 560 of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 281 (3d Cir.
1985) (emphasis added).
34. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 20.4(a) at 198 (2d ed. 2003).
35. Id.
36. See United States v. Clausen, 328 F.3d 708, 710 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that a violation of
the Hobbs Act need only have "a de minimis impact on interstate commerce" to satisfy its
jurisdictional element).
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B. THE APPLICABLE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY RELATING TO THE
HOBBS ACT
1. The Impetus for the Enactment of the Hobbs Act
The Hobbs Act was passed in 1948 as an amendment to the 1934 Anti-
Racketeering Act.37 The purpose of the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act was
"to set up severe penalties for racketeering by violence, extortion, or
coercion, which affects interstate commerce." 38 The original Hobbs Act
legislation was not meant to replace or substantially change the 1934 Anti-
Racketeering Act.39 Rather, Congress altered the 1934 Anti-Racketeering
Act to strengthen and clarify its provisions in response to the decision by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Local 807 of Inte-
rnational Brotherhood of Teamsters.40 In Local 807, various New York
City union members compelled out-of-state drivers to turn over their trucks
near the city limits. 41 The union members would then take the truck to its
destination, unload the merchandise, pick up the goods for the return trip,
and eventually surrender the truck back to the out-of-state driver at the same
point where the driver was stopped.4 2 The union members also demanded
the regular union rate from the out-of-state delivery driver for comparable
work driving, unloading, and returning the merchandise.4 3
At the time, the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act provided, in pertinent
part, as follows:
Section 2. Any person who, in connection with or in relation to
any act in any way or in any degree affecting trade or commerce or
37. See 91 CONG. REC. 11,911 (1945) (statement of Rep. Jennings) (noting that "[tihe
necessity for this measure grows out of the misconstruction placed upon the anti-racketeering law
enacted in 1934").
38. United States v. Local 807 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521, 530 (1942).
39. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 378 n.8 (1978) (pointing out that the 1934
Anti-Racketeering Act "was substantially carried forward into the Hobbs Act") (citing U.S. v.
Emmons, 410 U.S. 496, 404-05 n. 14 (1973)).
40. 315 U.S. 521 (1942); See 91 CONG. REC. 11,841, 11,911-13 (1945) (statements of Reps.
Cox, Jennings, and Whittington respectively). See also Culbert, 435 U.S. at 376 (acknowledging
that "the Hobbs Act was enacted to correct a perceived deficiency in the Anti-Racketeering Act"
created by the Court's decision in Local 807).
41. Local 807, 315 U.S. at 526. In Local 807, the court found that the "defendants conspired
to use and did use violence and threats to obtain from the owners of these 'over-the-road' trucks
$9.42 for each large truck and $8.41 for each small truck entering the city," which reflected the
union pay rate for a typical day's work. Id. Moreover, many other drivers paid the money
demanded by the defendants, but unloaded the goods themselves in the city because the
defendants "either failed to offer to work, or refused to work for the money when asked to do so."
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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any article or commodity moving or about to move in trade or
commerce... (a) [o]btains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or
attempt to use or threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the
payment of money or other valuable considerations, or the
purchase or rental or property or protective services, not including,
however, the payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-
fide employee: or (b) [o]btains the property of another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear, or under color
of official right ... (d) shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of
a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment from one to ten
years or by a fine of $10,000, or both.44
Thus, the exception emphasized above would apply if a court found that the
money was paid as part of a valid employment arrangement, and the defen-
dants would not have violated the Anti-Racketeering Act.45 The Court
concluded that the exception contained in the Act was not restricted to those
individuals who already "attained the status of an employee prior to the
time at which he obtains.., the [property]." 46 Consequently, the exception
applied and the Court found that the union members did not violate the
Anti-Racketeering Act.47
Congressional response to Local 807 was swift, as Congress sought to
overturn the Court's decision. 48 Congress removed the exception relied
upon by Local 807 and "substituted specific prohibitions against robbery
and extortion for the Anti-Racketeering Act's language relating to the use
of force or threats of force." 49 The purpose of the Hobbs Act was "to
protect trade and commerce against interference by violence, threats,
coercion, or intimidation." 50 The Hobbs Act was to be of general
applicability, as Congress sought to end the restraints on trade produced by
fear resulting from violence or the threat of violence.5 1 Members of
44. See Culbert, 435 U.S. at 375 n.5 (emphasis added) (quoting the language of the 1934
anti-racketeering statute as it was originally enacted).
45. Local 807, 315 U.S. at 530 (deferring to the purported Congressional intent to not
interfere "with traditional labor union activities").
46. Id. at 531.
47. Id. at 539. See Culbert, 435 U.S. at 376-77 (recognizing that the Court in Local 807 held
that the Hobbs Act "did not cover the actions of union truck drivers who exacted money by threats
or violence from out-of-town drivers in return for undesired and often unutilized services" given
the presence of the "wage-payments exclusion").
48. 89 CONG. REC. 3,221 (1943) (statement of Rep. Whittington). See Culbert, 435 U.S. at
377 (noting that several bills were introduced in Congress to change the result reached in Local
807).
49. Culbert, 435 U.S. at 377.
50. 89 CONG. REC. 3,194 (1943) (statement of Rep. Fish).
51. See id. at 3,206 (statement of Rep. Fellows).
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Congress conceded that the Hobbs Act would be "far reaching," 52 but the
majority thought that such action was necessary and used language
particularly illuminative given the parties involved in Scheidler.53
2. The Basis for the Provisions Constituting the Hobbs Act
Congress patterned the definition of extortion in the Hobbs Act after
New York law.54 In addition to the text itself, Congress recognized that
"[tihe ordinary meaning of the word 'extortion' is a taking or obtaining of
anything from another by means of illegal compulsion or offensive ac-
tion." 55 However, Congress explicitly exempted lawful picketing and other
lawful protest activities from the strictures of the Hobbs Act.56 Never-
theless, unlawful activities undertaken in the course of a strike or protest
could "come within the purview" of the legislation, 57 since one's legitimate
First Amendment right to strike did not include the right to commit
extortion during that strike.58  Indeed, Congress intended "to make
punishable all conduct falling within reach of the statutory language" of the
Hobbs Act.59
52. Id. at 3,223 (statement of Rep. Miller).
53. Id. at 3,226 (statement of Rep. Robsion) (emphasis added). Representative Robsion
stated:
I am not much worried over the penalties imposed on anyone who actually commits
robbery or extortion, in taking money or property or other thing of value from another
person by force or violence or by putting him in fear. No individual or group should
be permitted to engage in robbery or extortion in this free land of ours, even a church
or association of ministers.
Id.
54. Id. at 3,227 (statements of Reps. Hobbs and Vorys). See also 91 CONG. REC. 11,900
(1945) (statements of Rep. Hobbs) (stating that "[t]he definitions in this bill are copied from the
New York Code substantially").
55. 89 CONG. REC. 3,205 (1943) (statement of Rep. Graham).
56. Id. at 3,208-09 (statements of Reps. Brehm and Russell) (construing the Hobbs Act to not
cover labor members engaged in peaceful picketing). See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(c) (providing the
Hobbs Act "shall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect section 17 of Title 15, sections 52,
101-115, 151-166 of Tide 29 or sections 151-188 of Title 45"). See also United States v. Culbert,
435 U.S. 371, 377 (1978). Culbert recognized that:
[t]he primary focus in the Hobbs Act debates was on whether the bill was designed as
an attack on organized labor[, as] [o]pponents of the bill argued that it would be used
to prosecute strikers and interfere with labor unions [while] [t]he proponents...
steadfastly maintained that the purpose ... was to prohibit robbery and extortion
perpetrated by anyone.
Id. at 377; 91 CONG. REC. 11,843 (1945) (statement of Rep. Michener) (noting that the bill "will
not interfere with legitimate strikes").
57. 89 CONG. REC. 3,213 (1943) (statement of Rep. Hobbs). A strike did not give one a
license to act as an outlaw. 91 CONG. REC. 11,843 (1945) (statement of Rep. Michener).
58. 91 CONG. REc. 11,901 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hobbs).
59. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 377 (1978) (stressing that the Hobbs Act
"was to prevent anyone from obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce, or the movement of
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Moreover, Congress meant to convey a strong message through the
broad-reaching piece of legislation. For example, the Hobbs Act was
intended to:
[Slay to racketeers everywhere that no longer will they intimidate
and coerce the weak; no longer will they obstruct and retard, or
attempt to obstruct and retard, the orderly transportation of persons
and property in interstate commerce or foreign commerce; [as
Congress was]... determined to be on the side of law and order.60
Through passage of the Hobbs Act, Congress harshly attacked those who
sought to interfere with trade and commerce by racketeering, "violence,
threats, coercion, or intimidation." 61 Consequently, the Court has since
recognized that the Hobbs Act "speaks in [a] broad language, manifesting a
purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish
interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical
violence [and that] [t]he Act outlaws such interference []in any way or
degree." 62 More importantly, Congress's remedial legislation against
extortion has become an effective tool in the fight against organized
crime. 63
C. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF SCHEIDLER V.
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC.
1. The Mafia-like Activities Utilized by Anti-Abortion Groups
Such as the Pro-Life Action Network and Operation Rescue
The Pro-Life Action Network ("PLAN") and Operation Rescue are
anti-abortion groups whose members use protest tactics labeled "rescues" or
"blockades," whereby the activists "physically block access to abortion
clinics so that the patients and staff cannot get in or out of the buildings." 64
As part of these protests, some members would actively destroy a clinic's
medical equipment or chain themselves to operating tables in order to
any article or commodity in commerce by robbery or extortion as defined in the bill") (citation,
internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).
60. 91 CONG. REC. 11,917 (1945) (statement of Rep. Rivers). At the same time, Congress
recognized that the Hobbs Act "will not inconvenience, will not harm, will not incarcerate one
single honorable, honest, decent man in America." 91 CONG. REC. 11,841 (1945) (statement of
Rep. Barden).
61. 91 CONG. REC. 11,845 (1945) (statement of Rep. Bradley).
62. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) (citation omitted).
63. See United States v. Local 560 of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1985) (illustrating an example of where the Hobbs Act was used to reach members of organized
crime who had infiltrated and controlled a union).
64. Nat'l Org. for Women Inc., v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 693-95 (7th Cir. 2001).
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prevent the clinic from using them.65 In addition, PLAN members physi-
cally assaulted clinic staff, employees, and patients on many occasions.66
Furthermore, PLAN also demanded that other clinics voluntarily shut
themselves down or face the consequences of having a "rescue," as pre-
viously described, performed at that particular clinic. 67 PLAN implemented
these "rescues" in order to prevent patients from obtaining their desired
medical services. 68
2. The Long Odyssey of the Proceedings at the Lower Court
Level
In 1986, the National Organization for Women, Inc. ("NOW") filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.69
NOW alleged that Joseph Scheidler, the leader of PLAN, and other
members of PLAN and Operation Rescue, violated Sections 1962(a), (c),
and (d) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO").70 As part of the complaint, NOW asserted that PLAN engaged
in several instances of extortion under the Hobbs Act, which would then
serve as predicate acts for the purpose of RICO.71 The District Court
dismissed NOW's RICO complaint because it failed "to allege that the
predicate acts of racketeering or the racketeering enterprise were
economically motivated." 72 The District Court's dismissal was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.7 3 However, the United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case because it concluded that
"RICO [did] not require proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the
predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose."74
Upon remand, the jury found that PLAN had violated the civil
provisions of RICO. 75 Based on the jury's special verdict form, the District
Court determined that PLAN engaged in twenty-one separate acts of
extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. 76 Following the verdict, the
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Brief for Private Respondents at 4, Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393
(2003) (Nos. 01 -1118-19).
69. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 398 (2003).
70. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000) (providing the text of RICO).
71. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 398.
72. Id. (citation omitted).
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 398-99 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 399.
76. Id.
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District Court entered a permanent, nationwide injunction, which prohibited
PLAN from:
[I]nterfering with the rights of the class clinics to provide abortion
services, or with rights of the class women to receive those
services, by obstructing access to the clinics, trespassing on clinic
property, damaging or destroying clinic property, or using violence
or threats of violence against the clinics, their employees and
volunteers, or their patients. 77
PLAN appealed the verdict to the Court of the Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. In its appeal, PLAN contended that intangibles such as "the class
women's rights to seek medical services from the clinics, the clinic doctors'
rights to perform their jobs, and the clinics' rights to provide medical
services and otherwise conduct their businesses"- were not "property"
under the Hobbs Act.78 Alternatively, PLAN claimed that even if such
items were considered "property" for purposes of the Hobbs Act, the
"property" was not "obtained" by PLAN as expressly required within the
Hobbs Act because PLAN simply forced the clinics to "part with" such
property items. 79
The Seventh Circuit deemed PLAN's arguments to be fruitless in light
of the settled federal common law interpreting the Hobbs Act. Thus, the
court gave PLAN's arguments a cursory treatment.80 First, the court con-
firmed that "intangible property such as the right to conduct a business
[was] considered 'property' under the Hobbs Act." 81 Second, the court
rejected PLAN's alternative argument since a "long line of precedent" held
that "an extortionist can violate the Hobbs Act without either seeking or
receiving money or anything else [because] [a] loss to, or interference with
the rights of, the victim is all that is required." 82 Thus, the Seventh Circuit
determined that an extortionist need not physically "obtain" or receive
property in order to violate the Hobbs Act, and that a mere disruption of the
victim's property rights sufficed. This holding was in conformance with
the entire case law that had addressed the topic. 83
77. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir. 2001).
78. Id. at 709.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 707 (observing that PLAN's textualist argument should not detain the Court
long, for the Court began this part of its opinion by stating "[tlhe defendants have raised a
hodgepodge of other challenges to the judgment, none of which need detain us long").
81. Id. at 709 (citation omitted).
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. See generally Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 414 (2003)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing the major cases from every federal circuit on the topic and noting
that not all require the perpetrator to physically obtain the property he or she extorts).
[VOL. 81:33
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3. Scheidler Reaches the United States Supreme Court Again-
and the Court Reverses the Lower Court, Finding That PLAN
Did Not Commit Extortion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether PLAN's actions "constituted extortion in violation of the Hobbs
Act." 84 PLAN argued that the Seventh Circuit's decision vastly expanded
the definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act since the decision
effectively read the "obtaining" requirement out of the statute entirely. 85
PLAN further contended that the Seventh Circuit's opinion wholly con-
flicted "with the proper understanding of property for purposes of the
Hobbs Act." 86 In response, NOW countered that the measures utilized by
PLAN caused the class clinics "to give up" certain property rights, such as
"a woman's right to seek medical services from a clinic, the right of the
doctors, nurses or other clinic staff to perform their jobs, and the right of the
clinics to provide medical services free from wrongful threats, violence,
coercion, and fear."87 Additionally, NOW argued that PLAN sought to
control the use and disposition of the clinics' property by completely
disrupting "the ability of the clinics to function." 88 Furthermore, the United
States Government, as amicus curiae, argued that PLAN obtained the
clinics' intangible right to exercise exclusive control over the use of its
assets. 89
The Court began its decision by stating that it need not define "the
outer boundaries of extortion liability under the Hobbs Act," such as
whether "liability might be based on obtaining something as intangible as
another's right to exercise exclusive control over the use of a party's
business assets." 90 As a result, the Court's initial failure to address this
issue and come up with a workable standard adds to the uncertainty
surrounding the Court's decision. 91 Regardless of where that boundary may
be, the Court decided that PLAN plainly did not obtain NOW's property
since such a result would represent a vast expansion of extortion as used in
the Hobbs Act.92 Nonetheless, the Court curiously ensured that its decision
84. Id. at 400.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 400-01.
88. Id. at 401.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 402.
91. See id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "[t]he Court's murky opinion
seems to hold that [extortion] covers nothing more than the acquisition of tangible property")
(emphasis added).
92. Id. at 402.
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in no way affected or contradicted those lower court rulings such as United
States v. Tropiano,93 where "the intangible right to solicit refuse collection
accounts" was held to constitute "property" for purposes of the Hobbs
Act.94
The Scheidler Court then began its substantive evaluation of the Hobbs
Act by noting "the general presumption that a statutory term has its
common-law meaning."95 At common law, extortion required an individual
to actually "obtain" property.96 New York's common law, which served as
the basis for the Hobbs Act,97 indicated that "obtain" required "both a
deprivation and acquisition of property." 98 The Scheidler Court's decision
also noted that the rule of lenity, which applied to the Hobbs Act since the
Hobbs Act is a criminal statute, commanded that "the familiar meaning of
the word 'obtain'. . . should be preferred to [a] vague and obscure
[meaning]." 99 Thus, the Court concluded that the term "obtain," as used
within the Hobbs Act, required one to physically take the property of
another.10o
Next, the Court applied the above principles to the facts presented in
Scheidler, and held that PLAN did not violate the Hobbs Act because they
did not "obtain" NOW's property.101 Instead, PLAN merely "interfered
with, disrupted, and.., completely deprived [the clinics] of their ability to
exercise their property rights."102 Moreover, PLAN never pursued or
received anything of value, which they could then "exercise, transfer, or
sell."' 103 The Court was concerned that if PLAN's actions constituted
extortion under the Hobbs Act, then "the statutory requirement that property
must be obtained from another" would be effectively discarded. 104
However, none of the lower federal courts that previously addressed these
issues concerned themselves with this argument given the remedial nature
93. 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969).
94. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 402 n.6.
95. Id. at 402 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 402-03.
97. 91 CONG. REC. 11,843, 11,905 (1945) (statements of Reps. Michener and Robsion). See
also supra note 54 and accompanying text (providing and explaining the statement of Reps.
Hobbs and Vorys).
98. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 403 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 403-04 note 8; see id. at 409 ("[W]hen there are two rational readings of a criminal
statute, one harsher than the other, [a court should] choose the harsher only when Congress has
spoken in clear and definite language.").
100. Id. at 404.
101. Id. at 405,409.
102. Id. at 404.
103. Id. at 405.
104. Id.
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of the Hobbs Act and the powerful legislative history showing Congress'
intent to rid the country of extortion by all means.105 Regardless, the Court
further found that if the "obtain" requirement were eliminated from the
Hobbs Act, "the recognized distinction between extortion and the separate
crime of coercion" would no longer exist. 106 This distinction was allegedly
recognized in the New York Penal Code when "Congress turned to New
York law in drafting the Hobbs Act."107 The Court argued that PLAN had
simply engaged in acts of coercion against the class clinics,108 which was
not prohibited by the Hobbs Act.
4. The Dissenting Opinion Found That the Facts Presented in
Scheidler Reflected a Classic Example of Extortion
The Scheidler dissent recognized that no prior federal court had ever
construed the Hobbs Act to only cover the actual, physical acquisition of
tangible property.109 Such a cramped construction was unwarranted, espe-
cially given that the term "property" had been expansively construed for the
last few decades to include "the intangible right to exercise exclusive
control over the lawful use of business assets." 10 The federal common law
involving extortion, built over the previous fifty years further clarified that
"the right to serve customers or to solicit new business [was]... a protected
property right."111 Consequently, under a "commonsense" reading of the
Hobbs Act, "[t]he use of violence or threats of violence to persuade the
owner of a business to surrender control of such an intangible right is an
appropriation of control embraced by the term 'obtaining.""'12 Moreover,
no prior federal case had ever even discussed the alleged importance of the
distinction between "extortion" and the lesser crime of "coercion."' 13
105. See id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that "[n]o other federal court has ever
construed [the Hobbs Act] so narrowly"). See also supra text accompanying notes 60-61
(explaining the original Congressional intent of the Hobbs Act).
106. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 405 (2003).
107. Id.
108. Id. (noting that the crime of coercion "involves the use of force or threat of force to
restrict another's freedom of action").
109. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (8-1 decision).
110. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 415 n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See also Brief for the States of
California, et al. as Amici Curiae at 16, Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393
(2003) (Nos. 01-1118-19) (acknowledging that while coercion might have a broader reach than
extortion, the two crimes necessarily overlap and that "one who commits extortion ordinarily also
commits coercion").
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The dissent concluded by providing three additional considerations in
support of its analysis. First, "the uniform construction of the [Hobbs Act]
that ha[d] prevailed throughout the country for decades should remain the
law unless and until Congress decide[d] to amend the statute." 1l4 Second,
every federal court, including the Supreme Court, had "consistently iden-
tified the Hobbs Act as a statute that Congress intended to be given a broad
construction." 1 l5  Finally, "the principal beneficiaries of the Court's
dramatic retreat from the position that ... federal courts have maintained
throughout the history of [the Hobbs Act] will certainly be the class of
professional criminals whose conduct persuaded Congress that the public
needed federal protection from extortion [to begin with]."116
III. ANALYSIS
A. PLAN DID COMMIT EXTORTION UNDER THE HOBBS ACT AND THE
FEDERAL COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK PRIOR TO THE SUPREME
COURT'S RECENT DECISION IN SCHEIDLER
1. Governing Principles at the Time of the Scheidler Decision
a. The Expansion of "Property" Through the Passage of
Time
Prior to Scheidler, extortion under the Hobbs Act had been broadly
used as an effective prosecutorial weapon. In turn, courts gradually
extended flexibility to the explicit provisions contained in the statute. First,
various courts expanded the Hobbs Act by eliminating the requirement that
an extortionist actually receive tangible, physical property. This extension
was first documented in United States v. Tropiano, which stated that "[t]he
concept of property under the Hobbs Act, as devolved from its legislative
history and numerous decisions, [was] not limited to physical or tangible
property or things, but include[d], in a broad sense, any valuable right
considered as a source or element of wealth."117
This evolvement was again noted in United States v. Arena,118 which
acknowledged that "It]he concept of 'property' under the Hobbs Act [was]
114. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 416-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
115. Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
116. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969) (citations omitted).
118. 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999).
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an expansive one." 1l9 Arena recognized that the property involved in the
usual extortion prosecution typically involved an existing physical asset.120
However, the Arena court reiterated that the concept of property under the
Hobbs Act was "not limited to tangible things, but include[d] intangible
assets such as rights to solicit customers and to conduct a lawful
business."1 21 Similarly, additional support for the premise that intangible
rights are covered under the Hobbs Act comes from United States v.
Lewis. 122 Lewis concluded that "the 'property' of which the victim [of
extortion was] deprived need not be tangible, but may be no more than the
right to make his business decisions free of threats and coercion, or other
intangible rights."123 Lewis, like the majority of lower federal courts, used
"coercion" and "extortion" interchangeably, probably due to the similarity
between the two crimes. 124
More importantly, even New York, whose extortion statutes served as
the basis for the provisions of the Hobbs Act,125 adopted the expansive
definition of property as illustrated in Tropiano, Arena, and Lewis. New
York's expansive reading of the definition of property, as used in the
context of extortion, began with People v. Barondess.126 The court in
Barondess wrote that "there would obviously be no reason for so
distinguishing the word 'property' as it ha[d] been used in [the extortion
statutes] as to apply it solely to tangible articles capable in and of
themselves of receiving direct injury by the unlawful or wrongful act of
another." 27 Instead, the court maintained that property, as referred to in the
extortion statutes, referred to property "in its broad and unrestricted sense,
applying... to whatever may be properly maintained to be property." 128
119. Arena, 180 F.3d at 392.
120. id.
121. Id. (citations omitted). See also United States v. Local 560 of the Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 281 (3d Cir. 1985) (listing decisions from other circuits that have
extended the Hobbs Act to protect both intangible and tangible property).
122. 797 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1986).
123. Lewis, 797 F.2d at 364 (citations omitted and emphasis added). See also United States
v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that the "right to solicit business free from
threatened destruction and physical harm falls within the scope of protected property rights under
the Hobbs Act," since "the right to make business decisions and to solicit business free from
wrongful coercion is a protected property right" under the Hobbs Act property concept).
124. See infra text accompanying notes 209-12 (discussing the strong similarities between
coercion and extortion).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 54, 97 (discussing the use of New York law's
definitions of extortion and coercion in the Hobbs Act).
126. 31 N.E. 240 (N.Y. 1892).
127. Barondess, 31 N.E. at 242.
128. Id.
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People v. Wisch129 later reinforced the conclusion drawn in Barondess.130
Wisch held that the meaning of property, as used in the context of extortion,
was broad and that extortion covered intangible property.131 Consequently,
Wisch found that a milk route might constitute property capable of being
taken in an extortion prosecution. 32 Furthermore, People v. Kacer, 33 a
later New York decision, made clear that "extortion statutes seek to protect
a broad range of interests from oppression by those with special powers."'134
Thus, the case law of the federal circuits, and of New York itself, demon-
strate that "property," as used in the Hobbs Act, includes both tangible and
intangible property rights.135
b. The Gradual Erosion of the "Obtain" Requirement
In addition to the expansion of the term "property" as used in the stat-
ute, various courts expanded the Hobbs Act by eliminating the requirement
that the extortionist actually receive the benefits of the "property" extorted
from his or her victim. The court in United States v. Frazier136 began this
movement by concluding that the reduction of extorted property to actual,
physical possession by the extortionist was not a necessary element of the
Hobbs Act.137 The Frazier court was able to reach this result because
"[t]he gravamen of the offense [was] loss to the victim."l3 8 The Frazier
court also held that "for purposes of the 'obtaining of property' require-
ment, the offense of attempted extortion is complete when the defendant has
attempted to induce his victim to part with property." 139 Thus, extortion
can occur, for example, if the extortionist demands his or her victim to
129. 296 N.Y.S.2d 882 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
130. Wisch, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 448 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
134. Kacer, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
135. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1350 (3d Cir.
1989) (pointing out that other circuits "are unanimous in extending the Hobbs Act to protect
intangible, as well as tangible, property").
136. 560 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1977)
137. Frazier, 560 F.2d at 887. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Former Federal Prosecutors et
al. at 18, Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (Nos. 01-1118-19) (stating
that "[n]o [relinquishment] requirement existed at common law, and Congress has never imposed
such a limitation by statute").
138. Frazier, 560 F.2d at 887 (citations omitted and emphasis added); see also United States
v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that "the gravamen of the offense is loss to the
victim," as the Hobbs Act does not require the extortionist to act for his or her own benefit);
United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Hyde, 448
F.2d 815, 843 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 686 (3d Cir.
1964) (same).
139. Frazier, 560 F.2d at 887.
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"burn one million in cash,"' 40 or if the extortionist takes the right of a busi-
ness "to make a business decision free from outside pressure wrongfully
imposed.... "141
Moreover, Arena is again instructive as to the development of the
common law in this context. In Arena, the court reasoned that "[s]ince the
Hobbs Act concept of property is broad, 'the Act's requirement that
property be 'obtained' [should be] given a similarly broad construction.' 142
Furthermore, "[t]o commit extortion within the meaning of the Act, the
perpetrator of a physical attack or threat need neither seek nor receive an
economic benefit... and there is no requirement that the perpetrator of an
extortion receive the benefit of his act." 143 This is true because "[a] perpe-
trator plainly may 'obtain' property without receiving anything, for
obtaining includes 'attaining.. .disposal of' and 'disposal' includes 'the
regulation of the fate.. .of something."'1 44 In sum, the federal common law
prior to Scheidler made clear that the Hobbs Act covered intangible
property rights and that the extortionist was not required to take actual,
physical receipt of the "property" taken from another by force.14 5
2. PLAN Did Commit Extortion Under the Hobbs Act According
to the Federal Common Law Developed Prior to Scheidler
The crux of the problem in Scheidler was whether PLAN and
Operation Rescue "obtained" the "property" of the class abortion clinics for
purposes of the Hobbs Act. After applying the federal common law in
place prior to Scheidler, one can see that PLAN and Operation Rescue did,
in fact, commit extortion under the Hobbs Act.
a. PLAN Committed Extortion by "Obtaining" the Abortion
Providers' Lost Profits
First, PLAN "obtained" the "property" of the abortion clinics in the
form of lost profits, as many women refused to patronize abortion clinics
140. United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 1986).
141. Santoni, 585 F.2d at 673.
142. United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 394 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Town of West
Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 1990)).
143. Id. (citations omitted).
144. Id. (quoting WEBSTERS'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1559, 655 (1976)).
145. See Carole Golinski, Recent Decision, In Protest of NOW v. Scheidler, 46 ALA L. REV.
163, 179-80 (1994) (noting that the "obtain" requirement of the Hobbs Act "has received liberal
interpretation by the courts" and that courts have extended the Hobbs Act to specifically protect
one's intangible property rights).
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out of fear. 146 In Northeast Women's Center Inc. v. McMonagle,147 the
defendants stormed onto the premises of an abortion clinic, blocked access
to the clinic's operating rooms, and destroyed some of the clinic's medical
equipment.148 The defendants also physically attacked patients who were
attempting to gain access to the abortion clinic. 149 The defendants' activi-
ties were the primary cause of the clinic eventually losing its lease in the
building that it was occupying. 150
The McMonagle court found that the defendants had violated the
Hobbs Act by obtaining the clinic's right to continued operation of its
business.151 The court reasoned that the defendants' activities essentially
forced the clinic out of business.15 2 The right to conduct one's business,
and to receive the fruits and benefits therefrom, was a recognized property
right.1 53 Thus, PLAN "obtained," as will be shown in Part III.B.1-2, the
class clinics' "property" when they forced the clinics to close down and lose
the revenue that would have accrued to them had they still been fully
operational. 5 4 As a result, PLAN effectively threatened the class clinics to
either close down or else burn one million in cash revenue. 155
146. See, e.g., Respondent's Brief at 1-3, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-19) (describing how
PLAN members assaulted clinic patients); Clayton, supra note 1, at 971-72 (elaborating on how
PLAN threatened and physically attacked, assaulted, shoved, grabbed, and spat at women who
were attempting to gain access to clinic entrances); Patricia Ireland, The Rescue Racket:
Organized Crime and Mob Violence Against Women and Doctors, 21 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 845,
846 (1995) (recounting how a protestor "blasted through the door" to a clinic, knocked an
administrator down, and proceeded to jam his elbows against the administrator's neck, throw his
forearms across the administrator's throat, and physically slam the defenseless administrator
against the wall).
147. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989).
148. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345-46.
149. Id. at 1346.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1350.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See United States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 1973) (concluding that
business accounts and the unrealized profits from those accounts are intangible property within the
purview of the Hobbs Act).
155. See United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that extortion can
occur if the extortionist demands his or her victim to "bum one million in cash"); see also United
States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that "[t]hreatened force
may encompass fear of economic loss as well as physical violence"); Kristal S. Stippich, Behind
the Words: Interpreting the Hobbs Act Requirement of "Obtaining of Property from Another," 36
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 295, 307 (2003) (recognizing that "the revenues from the accounts that
[one] would not be servicing" could constitute "property" capable of being "obtained" for
purposes of the Hobbs Act).
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b. PLAN "Obtained" the Clinics' Right to Conduct Their
Business Free from Unwanted and Wrongful Fear
Second, PLAN similarly committed extortion by "obtaining" the
abortion clinics' right to make business decisions or otherwise conduct their
business free from wrongful outside influence, force, or pressure.156 In
Arena, the defendants poured butyric acid, a hazardous and toxic liquid, on
the premises of various reproductive health providers.157  The attacks
caused various clinics to close for several days, caused physical and
psychological harm to patients, doctors, and clinic employees alike, and
resulted in large environmental clean-up costs, which were undertaken by
the various medical facilities.158 The Arena court concluded that the
defendants had "obtained" the clinics' "right to conduct a business free
from wrongful force, coercion or fear."159 The court found that the attacks
were "part of an overall strategy to cause abortion providers.. .to give up
their property rights to engage in the business of providing abortion services
for fear of future attacks."160
Given the similarity in facts between Arena and Scheidler, one would
think that the well-reasoned Arena decision would directly apply to
Scheidler. Under Arena, PLAN essentially acquired the clinics' ability to
conduct its daily business and make its own business decisions free from
unwanted, wrongful interference.161 Instead, the clinics felt forced to give
into PLAN's demands for fear of future "rescues" or "blockades." 162
However, the Court chose not to follow Arena because it felt that the
"familiar meaning" of "obtain" should be used over the "vague and
obscure" meaning, especially in light of the rule of lenity. 163 Nevertheless,
the negative ramifications from the Court's decision to depart from Arena
will be explored in Part III.C.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978).
157. United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 385-86 (2d Cir. 1999).
158. Id. at 386-88.
159. Id. at 392.
160. Id. at 393.
161. Id.
162. See Respondent's Brief at 4-7, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-19) (describing the tactics used
by PLAN). Specifically, "PLAN's blitzkrieg tactics were widely feared by abortion providers and
their clients, and they were explicitly designed to cause such fear." Id. at 6.
163. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 403-04 n. 8 (2003).
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c. PLAN Committed Extortion by "Obtaining" the Clinics'
Right to Solicit Prospective Business Clients
Third, PLAN "obtained" the "property" of the class clinics by taking
away the clinics' right to solicit prospective patients. In Tropiano, the
defendant threatened Caron to stop Caron from servicing the defendant's
refuse or garbage removal customers. 164 As a direct result of the defen-
dant's threat and out of fear for himself and his family, Caron stopped
soliciting the defendant's customers. 165 The defendant argued that he did
not "obtain" any property because the right to solicit business was too
"amorphous" to come within the ambit of the Hobbs Act. 166
Tropiano rejected the defendant's argument and found that the right to
solicit business accounts unhindered by any territorial restrictions was a
property right that could be extorted.167 The facts in Scheidler are
analogous to those in Tropiano. For instance, PLAN threatened protests
and engaged in other acts of violence in order to prevent the clinics from
serving their customers and from attracting new ones. 168 These protests
even caused some clinics to occasionally shut their doors to business for
extended periods of time.169 Therefore, PLAN committed extortion under
Tropiano by "obtaining" the clinics' right to solicit new business customers
and accounts. 170 Stated differently, a clinic might have been afraid to ac-
tively solicit and advertise their abortion services for fear that it would
cause a backlash from PLAN. Practically speaking, there is no difference
between the threat made in Tropiano (e.g. "don't serve my refuse or
garbage customers or I'll kill you"), and the threat made in Scheidler (e.g.
"don't serve this segment of the population or we'll shut down your
business").
164. United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1073 (2d Cir. 1969).
165. Id. at 1074.
166. Id. at 1075.
167. Id. at 1076. See also United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1173 (9th Cir. 1980)
(explaining that the defendants in the case allegedly committed extortion by obtaining the
"goodwill and customer revenues of a competing tavern"). The defendants in Zemek obtained
their competitor's goodwill and revenues by "damaging the tavern with a Molotov cocktail...;
destroying [the tavern] by fire... ; tailing the owners of the tavern; breaking into their home and
threatening the occupants ... ; and plotting to blow up the tavern [at a later date]." Id. Similar to
Tropiano, the Zemek court held that "[tihe right to make business decisions and to solicit business
free from wrongful coercion is a protected property right." Id. at 1174. The similarities of
Scheidler to Zemek are startling as PLAN acted like the defendants in Zemek in order to obtain the
goodwill and customer revenues of the various abortion clinics, and to prevent the clinics from
soliciting future business out of fear.
168. Respondent's Brief at 1-8, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-19).
169. Id. at 6.
170. Tropiano, 418 F.2d at 1075-76.
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3. PLAN Even Committed Extortion Under New York Law,
Which Is Significant Since It Served as the Basis for the Hobbs
Act
In People v. Spatarella,171 the defendant threatened the victim to stop
servicing a business customer or face the prospect of "end[ing] up in the
hospital." 172 The victim complied with the defendant's demand and discon-
tinued his business relationship with the customer at issue. 173 The appli-
cable New York extortion statute at the time provided:
A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or
induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a
third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the
property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: (i) [c]ause
physical injury to some person in the future. 174
Thus, one could argue that this New York extortion statute was more
strenuous than the present form of the Hobbs Act since it required actual
delivery of property to the extortionist while the Hobbs Act merely requires
"the obtaining of property from another." 175 Accordingly, the defendant in
Spatarella argued that the New York extortion statute did not apply to him
because it was physically impossible to take or deliver a business customer
to another. 176
Nonetheless, the court rejected the defendant's "overly literal
arguments." 177 Instead, the court found that the defendant committed extor-
tion and held that the property obtained by the defendant was the business
generated by the victim's customer. 178 The court stressed
that physical destruction to property was not all that was
envisioned under the statute; that if a business were left to wither
and die for lack of workmen to carry it on there would be just as
destructive an effect as if real or personal property used in the
business were destroyed. [Continuing on, the court stated that]
business is property, as much so as the articles themselves which
are included in its transactions... [f]or it has been said by
Blackstone that property consists in the free use, enjoyment, and
171. 313 N.E.2d 38 (N.Y. 1974).
172. Spatarella, 313 N.E. 2d at 39.
173. Id.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2000).
176. Spatarella, 313 N.E.2d at 39 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 40.
178. Id.
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disposal of all the owner's acquisitions, without any control or
diminution save only by the laws of the land.179
Furthermore, the court reiterated "that the word property as used in the
statute 'is intended to embrace every species of valuable right and interest
and whatever tends in any degree, no matter how small, to deprive one of
that right, or interest, deprives him of his property."' 180 The court even
stated that "the extortionist's demand for the business itself, or a part of it,
[was], if anything, more egregious than the demand simply for money." 181
Clearly, intangible rights qualify as "property" for purposes of the New
York extortion statute. 182
Correspondingly, the facts presented in Scheidler were similar to those
in dispute in Spatarella. PLAN sought to end the business generated from
the various patrons of the class abortion clinics, much like the defendant in
Spatarella sought the business generated from the victim's customer for
himself. Instead of threatening "stop serving X or end up in the hospital,"
as demanded in Spatarella, PLAN demanded "stop serving X or we will
shut down your clinics."183 In sum, the abortion clinics possessed an
advantageous business relationship with women who were seeking abortion
services, but the medical providers were deprived of that business arrange-
ment because of PLAN's illicit behavior.184 PLAN committed the worst
179. Id. (citations omitted).
180. Id. (citation omitted).
181. Id.
182. Spatarella, 313 N.E.2d at 40. See also People v. Wisch, 296 N.Y.S.2d 882, 886 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1969) (demonstrating that the defendants in the case threatened milk dealers "that their
supply of milk would be cut off, that they would have work stoppages and they would be put out
of business."). Since the meaning of property under the extortion statute is "broad" and covers
"intangible property," "[a] milk route which has a pecuniary value is property and may be the
subject of an extortion." Id. Scheidler is again analogous to this decision, as PLAN directly
threatened the clinics with "blockades" and "rescues" that would result in work stoppages.
Respondent's Brief at 4-7, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-19). Additionally, PLAN's ultimate goal was
to shut down the clinics through the tactics mentioned in Part II.C. 1. Id. Moreover, since serving
a specific clientele has pecuniary value, this could represent potential property subject to an
extortion prosecution. See also People v. Kacer, 448 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1007-08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1982) (stating that "a threat to prevent an award of a future contract qualifies as a threat to harm a
business"). PLAN essentially engaged in the same activity as that of the defendant in Kacer, for
they threatened the clinics with violent protests in order to prevent women from entering into
abortion contracts with a clinic. Respondent's Brief at 4-7, Scheidler, (Nos. 01-1118-19).
183. Respondent's Brief at 4, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-19).
184. See Spatarella, 313 N.E.2d at 40 (recognizing that the victim "possessed an
advantageous business relationship which was based on an at-will arrangement and which,
because of [the defendant's] forceful and illegal behavior, deprived [the victim] of that business
arrangement, the advantage of which was obtained by and accrued to the defendant directly in
consequence of his extortive activity"). Even if the defendant had not directly received the
beneficial relationship with the victim's former business customer, the defendant would still have
been convicted of extortion at federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 560 F.2d 884, 887
(8th Cir. 1977) (noting that "it is not necessary to prove that the extortionist himself, either
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form of extortion as noted in Spatarella, by seeking to end the clinic's
business. 185
Therefore, as this Section demonstrates, the Hobbs Act protects one's
interest in intangible property.186 Furthermore, the clinics impacted by
PLAN's activities had protected intangible property at stake under the
federal common law framework developed prior to Scheidler.187 These
property rights included, among others, the lost business profits generated
by the clinics, the right to make business decisions free from unwanted
outside forces, and the right to solicit prospective customers or clients.188
In sum, the clinics had some sort of property rights at stake, "or otherwise
there would be no motivation for [the clinics'] acquiescence in the demands
of [PLAN]."189 Part III.B.1-2 of this Article will show that PLAN also
"obtained" the intangible rights possessed by the various class abortion
clinics.
B. BY FORCING THE CLINICS TO ABANDON THEIR INTANGIBLE
PROPERTY RIGHTS, PLAN "OBTAINED" CONTROL OF THESE
RIGHTS, AND COMMITTED BOTH EXTORTION AND COERCION
1. PLAN "Obtained" the Clinics' Intangible Property Rights by
Causing the Clinics to Surrender Such Rights to PLAN
By causing the various clinics to abandon their intangible property
rights, PLAN "obtained" this property for purposes of the Hobbs Act by
asserting effective control over it.190 When one is forced to abandon or part
with their intangible property right to make a business decision free from
harassment, such property must accrue or flow to another, as it just does not
remain uncontrolled in the middle of space. 191 Instead, the extortionist has
directly or indirectly, received the fruits of his extortion or any benefit therefrom [since] [tihe
gravamen of the offense is loss to the victim").
185. See supra text accompanying note 181 (explaining the Spatarella court's statement that
trying to deprive someone of their actual business may be worse than just demanding money).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 118-37 (discussing lower court interpretation of
extortion under the Hobbs Act).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 118-26 (explaining some of the federal common law
on extortion prior to Scheidler).
188. See supra Part III.A.2.a-c (arguing that PLAN in the Scheidler case did actually commit
extortion).
189. United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 395 (1st Cir. 1976).
190. See Brief of Amici Curiae Former Federal Prosecutors et al. at 9-10, Scheidler v. Nat'l
Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (Nos. 01-1118-19) (arguing that the pressure put on
clinics by organizations such as PLAN deprives the clinics of an intangible property right).
191. See United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 394 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that "even when
an extortionist has not taken possession of the property that the victim has relinquished, she has
nonetheless 'obtain[ed]' that property if she has used violence to force her victim to abandon it").
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obtained property in the sense that "they have secured for themselves the
use that they want of it," such as preventing the victim from competing with
the extortionist or forcing the victim from freely running their business. 92
By finding that PLAN's actions simply interfered with or disrupted the
clinics' functions, 93 the Scheidler majority ignored the reality of PLAN's
devastating effects and failed its "duty to construe the statute so as to make
it an effectual piece of legislation."194
For example, suppose the school bully threatens a fellow classmate by
stating, "Don't come to school this week or I will make your life
unbearable." The target, knowing full well that the bully has inflicted se-
vere pain on many fellow students in the past, convinces his or her guardian
that they were suddenly hit with a mysterious sickness and could not attend
school for the week. For all effective purposes, has not the school bully
both interfered with, and gained control of, the victim's right to receive an
education for the week?195 The decision not to go to school was solely
determined by the bully's threat, for the victim would have gone but for the
fear of being pummeled. In this instance, the victim's decision, and the
abandonment of his or her right to receive an education for a week, was
controlled, exercised, determined, acquired, obtained, dominated, or com-
pelled by the bully's threat. 196
The decision faced by the victim in the aforementioned example can be
directly paralleled to the decision faced by many of the clinics affected by
PLAN's actions. The clinics transferred control over their business deci-
sions to PLAN when they gave in to PLAN's demands and closed down or
abandoned their business.197 In essence, "[i]t is difficult to conceive a set of
facts that more clearly sets forth extortion as it is defined" in the Hobbs Act
because "obtain" is synonymous with "gaining control over" in these
192. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, 13, Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S.
393 (2003) (Nos. 01-1118-19).
193. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2003).
194. Commonwealth v. Downey, 429 N.E.2d 41,44 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
195. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 404-05.
196. In Arena, the court held that:
[W]here the property in question is the victim's right to conduct a business free from
threats of violence and physical harm, a person who has committed or threatened
violence or physical harm in order to induce abandonment of that right has obtained,
or attempted to obtain, property within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.
180 F.3d at 394. See also People v. Cadman, 57 Cal. 562, 564 (Cal. 1881) ("Assuming.. .that the
right to take and prosecute an appeal is property within the meaning of the Code, it follows that a
threat made for the purpose of inducing an appellant to dismiss an appeal is a threat made with
intent to extort property from another."). Thus, under the common law stemming from Cadman,
extortion did occur if one abandoned or gave up their property right in response to the fear
produced by another's threat. Id.
197. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, 44, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-19).
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instances.198 Moreover, a restrictive reading of the "obtain" requirement
would not further the underlying purposes of the Hobbs Act.199
Further, suppose the target in the above-described school example
ignored the bully's threat and went to school that week. As a result, the
bully subsequently destroyed the victim's school supplies (i.e. the bully
threw the victim's trapper in the mice-filled dumpster and snapped the
victim's pencils in half). Did the bully "obtain" the victim's school sup-
plies? Otherwise, how was the bully able to destroy the target's school
supplies without first physically "obtaining" them? Again, the parallel to
PLAN's activities can be drawn, for they destroyed clinic property on many
occasions as part of their "rescues." 200 Thus, it is contradictory for
Scheidler to recognize that PLAN destroyed medical equipment, yet still
hold that they did not physically "obtain" any clinic property.201
2. PLAN Committed Extortion Under a Natural Reading of the
Word "Obtain"
A commonsense approach to the definition of "obtain" also
demonstrates that PLAN obtained the class clinics' intangible property, as
referenced in Part III.A.2. "By its plain interpretation, the word 'obtain'...
includes the [extortionist's] 'obtaining' control over the victim's property
[since this] control causes the victim to discard or surrender that
property." 202 Moreover, in its simplest terms, "obtain" means "to get
possession of, especially by trying," or "to arrive at, to reach, to achieve." 203
Under this definition, PLAN "gained" or "attained," with extensive
planning and effort, the clinics' intangible property right to go about its
business free from wrongful harassment because PLAN's influence domi-
nated the clinics' decision-making. 04 By relinquishing control over their
voluntary business decisions, the clinics gave in to PLAN's threats.
198. See Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 438 n.6 (lst Cir. 1995) (noting that the appellees
used force, such as engaging in acts of physical destruction, trespass, vandalism, etc., in order to
extort the abortion clinic's "intangible right to freely conduct one's lawful business").
199. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62 (providing statements of members of
Congress on the intent behind the Hobbs Act).
200. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 702 (7th Cir. 2001).
201. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 405 (2003).
202. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Federal Prosecutors et al. at 9, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-
19).
203. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1236 (Deluxe 2d ed., 1983).
See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=obtain&x=17&y=22 (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (defining
"obtain" as "to gain or attain usually by planned action or effort").
204. See e.g., supra text accompanying notes 18-22 (explaining how attacks with butyric
acid on one clinic forced that clinic to close for a period of time to clean up).
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Consequently, this relinquishment, or turning over control, was "gained" or
"attained" by PLAN.
Furthermore, other words associated with the verb "obtain" include
"acquire, win, gain, attain, procure," or "get." 205 These words could also
adequately describe PLAN's conduct. By forcing the clinics to abandon
their intangible rights, as set forth in Part III.A.2, for a set period of time,
PLAN acquired, gained, picked up, secured, etc. those rights of the clinic.
In this regard, it might be helpful for one to think of these intangible rights
as part of a zero-sum game. What was lost by the clinics, for example, the
ability to solicit new business clients or make truly free business decisions
apart from wrongful outside pressure, was gained by PLAN. The forfeited
intangible property rights that the clinics formerly enjoyed did not remain
lost somewhere in the middle of space not possessed or controlled by
anyone. Rather, they are claimed, gained, and "obtained" by PLAN
themselves, as evidenced by PLAN's conduct after forcing the clinics to
close.206
3. Scheidler's Emphasis on Coercion was Misplaced and
Unnecessary, and Will Only Result in Obscuring Federal
Extortion Law
Additionally, the Court's curious invocation of the crime of coercion to
describe PLAN's conduct does not take away from the fact that PLAN also
committed extortion under the Hobbs Act.2 07 The Court's distinction
between extortion and coercion is impractical and unhelpful for future
courts facing the Hobbs Act given the similarity between the two crimes,
for extortion "is simply a subset of coercion." 208 Coercion only occurs if
liberty was the sole object of one's threat.209 For example, if a victim was
only forced to depart with their First Amendment right to free speech, then
coercion was the only crime that had been committed.210 In contrast, if one
was forced to give up control of one's property, then both coercion and
205. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1236 (Deluxe 2d ed., 1983).
See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE THEASAURUS, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/thesaurus?book=Thesaurus&va=obtain&x=19&y=lllast visited Jan. 26, 2004) (listing
synonyms of "obtain" as to "acquire, annex, chalk up, gain, have, pick up, procure, secure, [and]
win").
206. Respondent's Brief at 6, Scheidler (quoting PLAN leader Scheidler as bragging to his
followers that "[w]e got four abortion facilities to quit doing abortions one day[,] [w]e just told
them to quit... [aind if you don't we'll come in and shut you down").
207. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 405-06 (2003).
208. Respondent's Brief at 27 n.32, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-19).
209. Id.
210. Id.
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extortion have taken place, with coercion being a lesser-included offense. 2 11
Since PLAN obtained the clinics' intangible property, as shown in Parts
III.B.1-2, PLAN committed both the crimes of extortion and coercion. The
Scheidler Court itself even recognized the overlap of the two crimes when it
stated, "coercion and extortion certainly overlap to the extent that extortion
necessarily involves the use of coercive conduct to obtain property." 212
Nonetheless, the Court provided no guidance for future courts
attempting to distinguish between these seemingly congruent crimes.
Instead, the Court recounted that PLAN merely restricted the clinics'
"freedom of action." 213 PLAN's tactics undoubtedly caused many clinics to
lose business accounts and profits.2 14 Yet, since when were lost profits or
the ability to make business decisions free from wrongful outside pressure
associated with "freedom of action" and not "property"? While Scheidler
offered no explanation, such a question illustrates that there is no "clear line
dividing 'obtaining property' and restraining liberty." 2 t5 Finally, "[n]one of
the cases following... Tropiano... even considered the novel suggestion
that this method of obtaining control of intangible property amounted to
nothing more than the nonfederal misdemeanor of 'coercion.' 216 In this
regard, the Court's work is questionable since it contravenes all of the
"well-considered opinions" issued by the lower courts. 217
C. IF THE COURT INSISTS THAT INTANGIBLE "PROPERTY" MUST BE
PHYSICALLY ACQUIRED BEFORE A HOBBS ACT VIOLATION WILL
BE FOUND, THEN THIS ABSURD RESULT WILL SEVERELY HAMPER
EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE FUTURE
The Court's "new" approach 218 to the "obtain" requirement in the
Hobbs Act represents an abrupt departure from previous federal common
211. Id.
212. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 407-08. See also Brief for the States of California et al. as Amici
Curiae. at 16, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-19) (arguing that overlap exists "between the property
interests protected by prohibitions on extortion and liberty interests protected by prohibitions on
coercion [as] one who commits extortion ordinarily also commits coercion").
213. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 405.
214. See supra Part III.A.2.a (discussing how PLAN 'obtained' the lost profits of the clinics,
and thus, committed extortion).
215. Brief for the States of California et al. at 16, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-19).
216. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 415 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 376 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. By departing from the traditional principles concerning the Hobbs Act that had been
developed and established over the past three decades by numerous federal court decisions, I
believe that the Supreme Court has set forth a new, more restrictive approach to any extortion
prosecution under the Hobbs Act. As demonstrated by the decisions beginning in Part Il.A, the
federal common law had become more elastic and flexible in dealing with the many intangible
property right problems presented by a modern extortion prosecution. This beneficial evolvement
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law. Since Frazier, courts have uniformly rejected any defense arguments
that "the term 'obtaining of property,' as used in the Hobbs Act, meant
'reduc[tion] to actual physical possession.'- 219 However, this was essen-
tially the argument made by PLAN and accepted by Scheidler,220 and an
argument that will also reduce the effectiveness of the Hobbs Act as a
prosecutorial weapon, especially as applied to organized crime prosecu-
tions. In fact, Scheidler will "have grave implications for federal law
enforcement, [since] it.. .decriminalize [s] serious criminal conduct that
affects national interests, and criminal conduct that Congress has rightly
outlawed through the various federal extortion statutes." 221 The following
examples will illustrate this prediction, as they demonstrate that illegal acts,
which previously would have constituted extortion, no longer fit the defini-
tion of extortion after Scheidler.
1. The Court's New "Obtain" Requirement Would Have
Prevented Past Successful Prosecutions of Organized Crime
Members Under the Hobbs Act
In United States v. Local 560 of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,222 the United States Government brought a civil RICO action
against several reputed organized crime members. 223 The Government
alleged that the defendants had extorted Local 560's "right[] to vote, speak,
and assemble freely by systematic acts of intimidation." 224 The extorted
property right was also described as "the membership's... right[] to demo-
cratic participation in their union's affairs." 225 Many union members were
intimidated and feared to participate in the affairs of their local union
because of the repeated acts of violence by the defendants, which included
several acts of murder.226 The court found that this fear caused "a
significant proportion of Local 560's rank and file... to surrender their
membership rights."227 The defendants argued that only physical, tangible
has now been reversed by Scheidler, and the Court's new framework will have profoundly
negative effects, as will be demonstrated by this Part.
219. United States v. Frazier, 560 F.2d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 1977).
220. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 404-05.
221. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Federal Prosecutors et al. at 21, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-
19).
222. 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985).
223. Teamsters Local 560, 780 F.2d at 269-71.
224. Id. at 271.
225. Id. at 275.
226. Id. at 271, 275.
227. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
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property was capable of being extorted under the Hobbs Act.228 However,
the court summarily dismissed this argument and held that "right[s] incident
to union membership are protectible property interests" since "the language
of the Hobbs Act makes no... distinction between tangible and intangible
property." 229 Thus, the court upheld the defendants' convictions under the
Hobbs Act.230 Presumably, the court assumed that the defendants had
"obtained" the union's intangible right to democratic participation in their
affairs even though the court was silent as to this point.
Nevertheless, given Scheidler, the defendants in Teamsters Local 560
would now likely argue that they did not commit extortion because they did
not physically "obtain" the member's right to freely participate in their
union. This case illustrates the inherent problem with Scheidler's restrictive
approach to the "obtain" requirement. For instance, how can an extortionist
actually, physically "obtain" one's right to democratic participation in their
union, or any other intangible right for that matter? It is not as if the
extortionist can physically capture these intangible rights in order to trans-
fer or sell such property to another for valuable consideration. This is true
because, by definition, intangible property rights are those that lack physi-
cal form or substance, as "intangible" is defined as "that cannot be
touched," or something "that cannot be easily defined, formulated, or
grasped." 23 1 Moreover, other synonyms for "intangible" also include
"indiscernible.. ., unapparent.... [and] unobservable." 232  Nonetheless,
Scheidler requires an extortionist to physically "obtain" something of value
that can be exercised, transferred, or sold.233 Yet, this requirement leads to
an absurd result, as how can an extortionist physically "obtain" something
that lacks tangible form to begin with?234 For example, it would be
228. Id. at 281.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 296.
231. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 953 (Deluxe 2d ed., 1983).
232. BURTON'S LEGAL THESAURUS 307 (3d ed., 1998). See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE THESAURUS, at http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/thesaurus?book=Thesaurus
&va=intangible&x=22&y=12 (last visited Feb. 16, 2004) (providing the same synonyms).
233. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 405 (2003). However, this
requirement is curious in light of the settled law dictating that "extortion as defined in [the Hobbs
Act] in no way depends upon having a direct benefit conferred on the person who obtains the
property." United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420 (1956). Moreover, extortion "is committed
even though the person doing the extortion" might not get or receive the money or other benefit
being sought. United States v. Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 1959). Thus, if one does not
have to receive the benefit of their crime or the property that they extorted under the Hobbs Act,
why does Scheidler deem it important for an extortionist to receive "something of value from" his
or her victim which could be exercised, transferred, or sold? See Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 405.
234. This absurd result should have counseled the Court from taking the overly literal
interpretation it did of the meaning of extortion as written in the Hobbs Act. Scheidler, 537 U.S.
at 402. See also Brief for Petitioners Joseph Scheidler et al. at 27, Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for
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physically impossible for the defendants in Local 560 to "obtain" a union
member's intangible right to freely participate in union elections and affairs
because, under Scheidler, such a right cannot be transferred or sold to an-
other in the secondary market. This example demonstrates that Scheidler's
"new" rule limiting extortion to the physical receipt or acquisition of
property was illogical, absurd, and unsound as a matter of policy. 235
2. Recent Cases Exemplify That Scheidler Has Made
Prosecutions Under the Hobbs Act Less Viable for Federal
Prosecutors
The analysis and conclusions drawn in Part III.C. 1 are brought home
by the recent decision of United States v. Bellomo.236 In Bellomo, one of
the defendants, the alleged "boss of the Genovese Organized Crime
Family," was charged with violating the Hobbs Act by obtaining "the right
of a labor organization's members to free speech and democratic partici-
pation in their union's affairs... and to loyal and responsible representation
by such members' union officers, agents, employees and represen-
tatives." 237 The court subsequently addressed the two issues involving the
Hobbs Act, including (1) whether "the rights of union members [i.e. their
right to democratic participation in their union's elections and
affairs].. .constitute[d] 'property' within the meaning of the Hobbs Actf"
and (2) whether such property "could be 'obtained' within the meaning of
the Hobbs Act[.]" 238
Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (Nos. 01-1118-19) (stating that even "the trial court in this case
acknowledged[] [that] the concept of obtain separate from property makes very little sense in the
context of intangible rights") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See generally
Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result
Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 127-28 (1994) (acknowledging that
the absurd result doctrine provides an exception to the general rule of statutory interpretation that
a statute should be narrowly construed according to its plain meaning, as reasonable legislators
would not intend to create any absurdity).
235. See generally United States v. Marcano-Garcia, 622 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1980) (providing
another example of a case which would not have supported an extortion prosecution under the
Court's "new" "obtain" requirement in the Hobbs Act). In Marcano-Garcia, Puerto Rican
separatists kidnapped the Chilean Honorary Consul and demanded that he, among other things,
cancel the Fourth of July celebration, read a prepared statement to the media supporting Puerto
Rican independence, and claim that the Chilean government was "an assassin." Id. at 14.
Assuming arguendo that such items properly represent "property" under the Hobbs Act, how does
one go about "obtaining" this "property"? Can the cancellation of the Fourth of July celebration
be transferred, exercised, or sold to another? Such questions remain unresolved after Scheidler.
236. 263 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
237. Bellomo, 263 F.Supp at 564, 569.
238. Id. at 569-70.
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The court had no problem finding that the intangible rights taken by the
defendant constituted "property" for purposes of the Hobbs Act,239 espe-
cially in light of Arena,24o Tropiano,241 and Teamsters Local 560.242 This
was mainly because "property" represents "the bundle of rights to a thing"
and was "the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a
thing." 243 Thus, the court moved on to the heart of the case-"[t]he issue,
however, [was] not whether [the] right of a union member [was] property,
the question that Scheidler asks, [was] it property that is obtainable?"244
The Government in Bellomo cited Tropiano and Teamsters Local 560,
among others, to argue the following:
An organized crime figure who extorts a garbage hauler obtains
the intangible business opportunities of the victim in exactly the
same way that an organized crime figure who extorts union
members obtains the intangible property of his victim. In both
cases, nothing physical passes from the victim to the defendant,
but the victim's intangible right-whether to solicit business or
select union officers-is transferred to the extortioner, who then
exercises, transfers or sells it for his own enrichment.... A union
member's ability to nominate and elect his officers is something
that organized crime figures can obtain and then exercise, transfer
or sell. 245
Nevertheless, the Bellomo court was not persuaded in light of Scheidler, for
"the [c]ourt [was] constrained to ask how can that union member's right be
exercised, transferred or sold?"246
Thus, Bellomo visibly underscores the concerns raised in Part III.C.1,
as the court felt compelled to dismiss the Hobbs Act violation in light of
Scheidler since the defendant did not "obtain" a "thing" that could be
exercised, transferred, or sold to another. However, as previously argued,
such a requirement is absurd, as it is utterly impossible for an extortionist to
239. See Id. at 573 (holding that the word "property," as used in the context of the Hobbs
Act, embraces both tangible and intangible "things").
240. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21 (discussing the court's interpretation of
property in the Arena case).
241. See supra text accompanying note 117 (stating where the concept of property came
from).
242. See supra text accompanying note 229 (mentioning the statement by the Teamsters
Local 560 court that the Hobbs Act did not distinguish between types of property [tangible or
intangible]).
243. Bellomo, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (quoting Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433
(1856)).
244. Bellomo, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
245. Id. at 575 (citation omitted).
246. Id. at 575-76.
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physically "obtain" a "thing" that lacks tangible form.247 Moreover, since
an extortionist cannot physically present this "thing" to another on the street
or at a secondary market, the extortionist also cannot possibly exercise,
transfer, or sell these intangible property rights to another.
D. THE RULE OF LENITY DOES NOT SHIELD PLAN FROM LIABILITY
UNDER THE HOBBS ACT
Scheidler's invocation of the rule of lenity was inappropriate since
Congress spoke "in clear and definite language" 248 and that "[tihe mere
possibility of articulating a narrower construction ... does not by itself
make the rule of lenity applicable." 249 During debate of the Hobbs Act,
many Congressmen expressly exempted perfectly lawful protestors,
picketers, and strikers from the provisions of the Hobbs Act.250 Only
unlawful acts would come within the purview of the proposed legislation.25 1
Additionally, the presence of a strike did not give one a license to act as an
outlaw and the Hobbs Act in no way interfered with one's ability to carry
out a peaceful, law-abiding, and legitimate protest.252  Thus, many
Congressmen agreed with the view that the Hobbs Act would "not
inconvenience .... harm, [or] ... incarcerate one single honorable, honest,
decent man in America" because honest men would not commit extortion
while on strike. 253
More importantly, "'[t]he simple existence of some statutory
ambiguity.. .is not sufficient to warrant application of [the rule of lenity],
247. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing Teamsters Local 560 and how the new "obtain"
definition would have prevented the successful prosecution of organized crime figures).
248. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003).
249. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993).
250. See, e.g., 89 CONG. REc. 3,213 (1943) (providing the statement of Rep. Hobbs). See
supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing statements by Reps. Brehm and Russell). See also
Brief for the States of California et al. as Amici Curiae at It, Scheidler (Nos. 01-1118-19)
(arguing that "[niot only are protest activities ordinarily outside the scope of the Hobbs Act itself,
but the First Amendment independently forecloses its application to attempts by protestors,
through speech, to pressure a target to conform his conduct to public opinion"). Thus, it is
erroneous to contend that application of the Hobbs Act to the defendants in Scheidler will result in
less social protest by society since the First Amendment fully protects individuals who engage in
non-violent protest activities. See generally Brian J. Murray, Note, Protesters, Extortion, and
Coercion: Preventing RICO from Chilling First Amendment Freedoms, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
691,709-22 (1999) (discussing the Hobbs Act).
251. 89 CONG. REc. 3,212-13 (1943) (statements of Reps. Springer and Hobbs). See supra
text accompanying notes 57-58 (providing the statements of Rep. Hobbs).
252. 91 CONG. REC. 11,841-43 (1945) (statements of Reps. Barden and Michener). See
supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (discussing the statements of Reps. Brehm, Russell, and
Hobbs).
253. 91 CONG. REC. 11,841 (1945) (statement of Rep. Barden). See supra note 60
(providing the statement of Rep. Rivers).
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for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree."' 254 Instead, "[t]he rule of
lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be
derived,. . we can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intend-
ed." 255 As previously stated, Congress did not intend for the Hobbs Act to
be used in prosecuting groups engaged in legitimate, perfectly lawful
protest activities. 256 Thus, the Court did not have to "guess" as to the scope
of the coverage entailed by the Hobbs Act, since Congress was clear as to
what it sought to remedy. 257 Furthermore, before invoking the safeguards
of the rule of lenity, the Court must find that a "grievous ambiguity or
uncertainty" exists in the statute. 258 Scheidler never identified this "griev-
ous ambiguity or uncertainty" in the statute, probably because the definition
of extortion came from New York law and needed no further clarification
since New York courts had construed extortion many times. 259 In any
event, the rule of lenity does not automatically permit the defendant to
prevail and his or her conviction to be dismissed.260
Finally, Scheidler was heard before the Court precisely because the
defendants had been behaving illegally, as the defendants in Scheidler
candidly admitted that aspects of their conduct were criminal.261 Hence,
PLAN was sufficiently on notice that its illicit conduct could be severely
punished, yet they still advocated for the continued lawlessness of its "res-
cues" or "blockades." 262 Such blatant disregard for society's laws indicate
that PLAN should not undeservedly receive the equitable treatment of the
rule of lenity, especially since Congress intended the Hobbs Act to serve as
a broad weapon against extortion.2 63 Thus, the rule of lenity should not
apply because this was not "a case where the defendant was in ignorance of
the possible criminality of his conduct so that subjecting him to the applica-
tion of the statute is unfair."264 No group should be allowed to exist above
254. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (quoting United States v. Wells,
519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)).
255. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
256. See supra text accompanying note 56 (citing statements by members of Congress
debating the Hobbs Act indicating its intended inapplicability to peaceful picketing).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53 (providing statements by members of
Congress expressly indicating the intent behind the Hobbs Act).
258. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138-39.
259. 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hobbs) (noting that "there is nothing
clearer than the definition of ... extortion in this bill" since the crime has "been construed by the
courts not once, but a thousand times").
260. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139.
261. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 404 (2003).
262. See supra note 206 (discussing a quote from PLAN's leader about forcing clinics to
close).
263. United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373 (1978).
264. Commonwealth v. Downey, 429 N.E.2d 41, 45 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
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the law, and extortion should be prosecuted regardless of who commits it265
or regardless of what their ideological motive might have been for acting, 266
because Congress sought to eradicate the fear that griped many individuals
who were affected by extortionate threats of violence.2 67
IV. RECOMMENDATION
A. FUTURE COURTS SHOULD NARROWLY CONSTRUE SCHEIDLER TO
CIRCUMVENT ITS ABSURD RESULT
Scheidler's effect will be, and has already been, substantial.2 68 Many
future defendants charged with extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act will
make a "Scheidler" claim-i.e. extortion was not committed because no
physical, tangible item was ever received which could then be resold in the
secondary market. As of February 26, 2004, approximately one year after
the Scheidler decision, this new "Scheidler" defense had been invoked in
four cases. 269 Thus, what are future courts to do when faced with the
onslaught of "Scheidler" claims? For one, they can interpret Scheidler very
narrowly, as the court in Dooley v. Crab Boat Owners Assocation270 did.
1. The Dooley Approach to the Scheidler Defense
In Dooley, the Caitlin Ann company owned a fishing boat also named
the Caitlin Ann.2 71 The plaintiffs oversaw the management of the company,
which commercially harvested crab off the Pacific Coast by "using steel
and wire traps, or pots, that rest on the ocean floor."272 A conflict arose
265. 91 CONG. REC. 11,912 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hobbs) (pleading that "crime is crime,
no matter who commits it"). See supra text accompanying note 53 (discussing the statement of
Rep. Robison on the Hobbs Act).
266. See Ireland, supra note 146 , at 850-51 (arguing that "[iut is sound policy to look at
conduct rather than motives" in these sorts of Hobbs Act cases for "that is what the racketeering
laws require").
267. 91 CONG. REc. 11,905-07 (1945) (statements of Reps. Robsion and Fellows).
268. Some may argue that little weight should be attributed to Scheidler's discussion of the
Hobbs Act since it was decided in the context of a RICO case. However, this argument is
unpersuasive in light of the fact that many significant Supreme Court decisions have altered the
understanding of the mail fraud statute in the context of RICO cases. See, e.g., Cleveland v.
United States, 531 U.S. 12, 16 n.l, 20 (2000) (holding, where the defendant was charged with a
RICO violation, that a state or municipal license is not "property" for purposes of the mail fraud
statute).
269. United States v. Warner, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1063 (N.D. III. 2003); Interstate
Flagging, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 283 F. Supp. 2d 641, 647 (D. Conn. 2003); Dooley v. Crab Boat
Owners Ass'n, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2003); United States v. Bellomo, 263 F.
Supp. 2d 561, 575-76 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
270. 271 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
271. Dooley, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1208.
272. Id.
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when California opened its crab season in 2001 because the three defendant
associations, in an act of solidarity, "refused to harvest crab in an effort to
negotiate a favorable fixed price with buyers." 273 Trouble brewed between
the parties when the plaintiffs "did not join the strike" because they were
already under contract to provide crab for a buyer, Exclusive Fresh.274 On
November 16, 2001, certain defendants allegedly "threatened Dooley [and
his crew] with trouble if he harvested crab during the strike."275
Subsequently, the defendants allegedly cut four hundred of the Caitlin
Ann's fishing lines the next day.276 The crew of the Caitlin Ann also found
additional cut lines within the next couple of days. 277
Moreover, "[a]fter Caitlin Ann's crew had begun fishing, Exclusive
Fresh refused to perform its contract with Caitlin Ann, allegedly because of
threats from [the defendants]."278 Further, the defendants "deliberately
blocked the Caitlin Ann from docking in order to punish plaintiffs for
harvesting crab during the strike."279 This forced the plaintiffs to sail to San
Francisco and incur "additional costs and loss of crab." 280 Nonetheless, the
plaintiffs were able to find "a new buyer for their crab, J & S Quality
Seafood."281 However, this promptly caused the defendants to allegedly
threaten "the owner of J & S with blackballing if he purchased 'scab'
crab." 282 In addition, the defendants even purportedly "contacted customers
of J & S to dissuade them from purchasing the crab and even intercepted
customers in front of the J & S store." 283
Predictably, the defendants invoked a "Scheidler" claim-they argued
that they had not violated the Hobbs Act because they did not physically
"obtain" any of the plaintiffs' property.284 Given Scheidler, the defendants
further contended that "[t]he most that could have been achieved by [their]
acts... [was] that plaintiffs ceased their fishing operations during the
strike."285 Consequently, the defendants claimed that this "result would de-
prive plaintiffs of their property but would not transfer that property to [the]
273. Id. at 1208-09.
274. Id. at 1209 (internal quotation marks omitted).
275. Id.
276. Dooley v. Crab Boat Owners Ass'n, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
277. Id.
278. ld.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Dooley, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
284. Id. at 1210-11.
285. Id. at 1212.
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defendants."286 On the other hand, the plaintiffs argued "that Scheidler
[did] not extend to actions such as the ones at issue in this action, in which
an individual seeks control over a competitor's right to operate a
business." 287
Dooley began its analysis of Scheidler by noting that it "left open the
possibility that the right to operate a business could be 'obtained' by
opining that 'liability might be based on something as intangible as
another's right to exercise exclusive control over the use of a party's
business assets."' 2 88  Dooley then recognized that Scheidler accepted
Tropiano because the Court "specifically stated that it did not reach or
reject the holding that the 'intangible right to solicit refuse collection
accounts' was property under the Hobbs Act."289 As a result, the Dooley
court interpreted these two propositions together to conclude "that if an
individual gains control over the use of a competitor's business asset, even
if the asset is as intangible as the right to solicit business, that person has
obtained the property of another within the meaning of the Hobbs Act."290
Thus, Dooley eventually held "[tlhe individual that gains control over the
use of a competing business's asset does more than coerce by restricting the
competing business's freedom of action[, since] [t]hat person extorts by
acquiring something of value that can be exercised to his benefit." 291
Applying these principles, Dooley found that the defendants had
attempted, through threats and property damage, to gain control over Caitlin
Ann's intangible property right "to harvest crab during the crab season." 292
For example, the "[d]efendants threatened injury to the crew of the Caitlin
Ann, damaged the boat and its fishing equipment, and warned purchasers
and their customers that they would be blackballed if they bought crab from
plaintiffs." 293 These extortionate acts demonstrated a concerted effort by
the defendants "to keep Caitlin Ann from harvesting crab during the
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1213 (emphasis added).
288. Id. (citing Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 401 (2003).
289. Dooley, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1213 (citing Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 402 n.6).
290. Dooley, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1213 (emphasis added). Scheidler specifically left this inter-
pretation open for future courts to take in the course of its decision. See supra text accompanying
note 90 (discussing the Scheidler case's analysis of the Hobbs Act).
291. Id. (emphasis added). The requirement that an extortionist actually acquire or obtain
"control" over something of value within another's business effectively assuages the concerns of
Scheidler that the statutory language of the Hobbs Act would be discarded if it held that PLAN
committed extortion under the facts presented in the case. See supra text accompanying note 104
(discussing the Scheidler court's concern about labeling PLAN's actions extortion).
292. Dooley, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
293. Id.
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strike."294 Moreover, this "[c]ontrol over the Caitlin Ann company's
fishing operations during the crab season was of value to defendants."295
Presumably, this control was of pecuniary value to the defendants.
Future courts can learn something of value from the approach taken by
Dooley. Under Dooley, future courts should narrowly construe Scheidler
and search for something of value which can be controlled and exercised to
the defendant's benefit. For example, the court in Teamsters Local 560296
could have found that the defendants controlled the union's intangible right
to democratic participation in its own affairs, which was valuable to the
defendants because they used this right to receive payoffs for their own
financial gain. 297 Similarly, the Bellomo court298 could have held that the
defendants "obtained" the union's intangible right to democratic participa-
tion in its union by controlling the valuable benefit of having a union sub-
mit to their views and carry out their agenda. Such a narrow interpretation
would mitigate the negative result reached by Bellomo and cabin the absurd
result set forth in Scheidler. Furthermore, this construction would facilitate
the continued prosecution of white-collar or organized crime defendants
under the Hobbs Act.
B. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE HOBBS
ACT TO CLARIFY THAT AN EXTORTIONIST NEED NOT
PHYSICALLY ACQUIRE PROPERTY IN ORDER TO BE CRIMINALLY
PROSECUTED
Another potential solution is to lobby Congress to amend the Hobbs
Act in such a fashion as to overrule Scheidler.299 Before Scheidler was
decided, the meaning of extortion under the Hobbs Act had judicially
evolved to cover current societal problems, such as that presented in
Scheidler. This evolvement can be traced to two trends in extortion juris-
prudence. First, courts gradually expanded the definition of "property"
under the Hobbs Act to include one's intangible property rights, such as the
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See supra Part III.C.1. (discussing the definitions of the 'obtain' requirement as used by
the Teamsters Local 560 court).
297. See, e.g., United States v. Local 560 of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 273
(3d Cir. 1985) (stating that defendant Provenzano used Local 560 to extort payoffs from various
companies in return for "labor peace" and that Provenzano recruited another to kill a popular
member of the union who posed a threat to the defendant's control over Local 560).
298. See supra Part III.C.2. (discussing the Bellomo decision).
299. See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 417 n.2 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that "Congress remains free to correct the Court's error in [this]
case").
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right to democratic participation in union affairs as shown by Teamsters
Local 560 and the right to solicit business customers free of territorial
restrictions as illustrated by Tropiano.300 Next, courts slowly eroded the
"obtain" requirement in the Hobbs Act by initially concluding that an
extortionist need not directly benefit from his or her illegal acts and then by
emphasizing that the gravamen of the crime of extortion is simply a loss to
the victim. 301
These developments illustrate that an extortionist violates the Hobbs
Act if he or she deprives another of their intangible property rights to the
extent that they gain control over these rights. The two trends represented
the state of the federal common law involving extortion at the time
Scheidler was presented and decided. More importantly, even New York
courts incorporated these changes, as shown by New York's highest court
in Spatarella.30 2 This is particularly revealing since New York's extortion
statute served as the basis for the extortion definition as originally
implemented in the Hobbs Act.303 Thus, the federal common law suffi-
ciently evolved to cover the form of extortion that was involved in
Scheidler.
Consequently, the Court's abandonment of this federal extortion
common law and its return to a strict construction of extortion was remi-
niscent of the Court's decision in McNally v. United States,304 which was
subsequently overruled by a Congressional statute. McNally involved the
prosecution of a former public official under the mail fraud statute.305 The
defendants allegedly participated in a self-dealing patronage scheme that
"defrauded the citizens and government of Kentucky of certain 'intangible
rights,' such as the right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted
honestly." 306 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had upheld the
defendant's mail fraud conviction by relying "on a line of decisions from
300. See Murray, supra note 250, at 715 (recognizing that this "judicial extension" of
"property" was "surely reasonable" and "justifiable based on the changes that have occurred in the
ways in which wealth is owned in a modem society" because "[t]he protection of ownership was,
after all, the purpose of extortion").
301. See id. at 720 (concluding that these developments "effectively discard[ed] the require-
ment that an extortionist or some other third party 'get' the property of which the victim is
'deprived[,]' [as] extortionate 'obtaining' now requires only that the victim be 'deprived' of
something").
302. See supra text accompanying notes 171-85 (discussing how PLAN's actions fit New
York law's definition of extortion).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 54, 97 (discussing statements made by Reps.
Michener, Robsion, Hobbs and Vorys).
304. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
305. McNally, 483 U.S. at 352.
306. Id.
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the Courts of Appeals holding that the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes
to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial gov-
ernment." 307 The McNally Court found that "[tihe mail fraud statute clearly
protect[ed] property rights, but [did] not refer to the intangible right of the
citizenry to good government." 308 The Court also invoked the rule of lenity
in holding that the scope of property rights under the mail fraud statute was
limited to money or property, and did not encompass one's intangible
rights, such as the right to honest and faithful services. 309
Congressional displeasure with McNally was rampant, and Congress
quickly responded to overrule the Court's decision through legislation.10
Congress subsequently enacted a law to specifically articulate that the mail
fraud statute covered "the intangible right of honest services." 311 One can
see many parallels between the circumstances and reasoning in McNally
and the Court's recent decision in Scheidler. For example, the appellate
courts in both cases relied upon a long-standing, uniform, consistent, and
sensible construction of the applicable statute among the lower federal
courts. 312 Moreover, both statutes were to be liberally construed 313 and
involved similar subject matter-the interpretation of "property" in the
context of a white-collar penal statute. 314 In addition, the Court in both
instances specifically chose a limited construction of the relevant statute by
invoking the rule of lenity.315 Finally, the Court also rejected the evolved
307. Id. at 355.
308. Id. at 356.
309. Id. at 359-61.
310. PAMELA H. BucY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME, CASES & MATERIALS 78 (2d ed. 1998)
(acknowledging that immediately following the McNally decision, "Congress began hearings on
how to amend the mail fraud statute to remedy the 'McNally problem').
311. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
312. See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "[flor decades[,] federal judges have uniformly given the term 'property' an
expansive construction that encompasses the intangible right to exercise exclusive control over the
lawful use of business assets" and that the appellate court's decision "is the commonsense reading
of the statute that other federal judges have consistently and wisely embraced in numerous cases
that the Court does not discuss or even cite"); McNally, 483 U.S. at 364 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that "[t]he many federal courts that have confronted the question whether these sorts
of schemes constitute a 'scheme or artifice to defraud' have uniformly and consistently read the
statute in the same, sensible way").
313. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 362 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra text
accompanying note 62 (providing that the Court recognizes that the Hobbs Act's broad language
grants Congress many powers to prevent interference in Interstate Commerce through extortion).
314. Of course, Scheidler glossed over the concept of "property" under the Hobbs Act
because it found that PLAN did not "obtain" anything in any event. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 402.
However, the Court's finding demonstrates that intangible rights do not qualify as "property" for
purposes of the Hobbs Act because such rights are incapable of being physically "obtained" or
captured. See Part III.C. (demonstrating the absurdity of this result).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 99, 163, 310 (discussing the statutory construction
or interpretation used by the Scheidler and McNally courts, respectively).
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federal common law involving the interpretation of either the mail fraud
statute or the Hobbs Act.316
Given that Scheidler poses a serious impediment to the effective
enforcement of the Hobbs Act,3 17 the Court's interpretation was not true to
Congress' original intention in eradicating, by all means possible, the fear
that extortion produced. 318  As a result, Congress should recognize
Scheidler's misconstruction of the Hobbs Act and react accordingly, as they
did after McNally's similar misconstruction of the federal mail fraud statute.
Therefore, Congress should amend the Hobbs Act to restore the previous
common law understanding of extortion that was provided by the many
lower federal courts, since this jurisprudence had correctly developed the
Hobbs Act to cover current societal extortion problems. 319
V. CONCLUSION
The Hobbs Act was a major remedial piece of legislation that was
broadly intended to curb the rising occurrence of extortion. However, its
effectiveness was seriously impaired when the Court decided Scheidler v.
National Organization for Women, Inc., as the very real possibility exists
that the Court's interpretation of the Hobbs Act will only benefit
professional criminals like organized crime families. 320 In doing so, the
Court summarily rejected the federal extortion common law built to that
point. Prior to Scheidler, the provisions of the Hobbs Act had been liberally
expanded to cover intangible property rights.321 Additionally, courts recog-
nized that the "obtain" requirement was met when an extortionist deprived
his or her victim of property since the heart of extortion focused on the
victim's loss. 322 These two lower court trends were sound constructions of
the Hobbs Act and its legislative history, and were necessary in order to
316. See BUCY, supra note 310, at 75 (noting that "[u]ntil 1987 courts affirmed convictions
of government officials who had been convicted of mail fraud on the theory that the officials
defrauded citizens when the officials represented that they were providing honest and faithful
services where they were not"); see supra text accompanying notes 109, 299-300 (noting that no
prior federal case had interpreted the Hobbs Act as narrowly as did the majority in Scheidler).
317. See supra Part III.C. (arguing that Scheidler hampers effective law enforcement).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53, 60-61 (discussing the Hobbs Act, generally).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 300-01 (discussing the common law understanding
of the Hobbs Act prior to Scheidler).
320. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 376 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
that lingering doubts remain "about why a Court that has not been particularly receptive to the
rights of criminal defendants in recent years has acted so dramatically to protect the elite class of
powerful individuals who will benefit from this decision").
321. See supra text accompanying notes 301-02 (discussing the common law understanding
of the Hobbs Act prior to Scheidler).
322. See e.g., United States v. Frazier, 560 F.2d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 1977) (emphasizing loss
to the victim in extortion statutes).
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protect society's changing needs. Nonetheless, these lower federal court
opinions are now subject to attack by defendants who will argue that they
did not commit extortion because they never physically received or ob-
tained the intangible property right at issue.323
Moreover, Scheidler was especially distressing since no other federal
court had ever construed the Hobbs Act so narrowly in holding that
extortion required the actual, physical acquisition of property, which could
then be exercised, transferred, or sold in turn. 324 In this respect:
The quality of this Court's work is most suspect when it stands
alone, or virtually so, against a tide of well-considered opinions
issued by state or federal courts. In these cases I am convinced
that those judges correctly understood the intent of the Congress
that enacted this statute. Even if I were not so persuaded, I could
not join a rejection of such a longstanding, consistent interpre-
tation of a federal statute. 325
Furthermore, the Court's "retrospective contraction" of extortion's common
law meaning under the Hobbs Act also "properly deserves the stigma of
judicial legislation." 326 Accordingly, if Congress does not legislatively
"fix" the Hobbs Act by overturning Scheidler, then future courts faced with
a Scheidler defense must narrowly construe the Court's decision like that
done by the court in Dooley v. Crab Boat Owners Association. 27
323. See supra text accompanying notes 236-47 (presenting recent cases in which the
defendant used the new "Scheidler" defense).
324. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "the most distressing aspect of the Court's
action today is its casual-almost summary-rejection of the accumulated wisdom of the many
distinguished federal judges who have thoughtfully considered and correctly answered the
question these cases present."). Perhaps the Court's decision in Scheidler can be explained by the
following observation:
This Court's abortion decisions have already worked a major distortion in the Court's
constitutional jurisprudence. Today's decision goes further, and makes it painfully
clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this Court when
an occasion for its application arises in a case involving... abortion.
Thornburgh v. Amer. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
325. McNally, 483 U.S. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
326. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 419 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 271-98 (discussing the Dooley court's approach to
Scheidler).
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